Policy briefArctic Norway - Aspects of Politics, Government and International Relations · Autumn 2026

Blind Spots in the High North

Why France should help Norway expose Russian GNSS jamming in Finnmark, and how the DGA can do it from space

Memorandum

To
Direction générale de l’armement (DGA)
From
Julien Ribiollet, Sciences Po, Paris & UiT The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø
Date
Subject
Russian GNSS interference in Finnmark and the Barents Sea: a French contribution under the Narvik Arrangement
12 min read · 7 sections · 4 interactive figures
Contents
  1. Just a small spillover
  2. From nuisance to routine: the problem in Finnmark
  3. Spillover by design
  4. Why Finnmark is France’s problem too
  5. The constraint: help without escalating
  6. Recommendations to the DGA
  7. Conclusion: no more blind spots
  8. References
About the author

I am a French cybersecurity engineer with a Master’s in Information Systems Security, now completing a second Master’s in International Security with a focus on the Nordic countries.

Throughout my studies, I took an interest for anything standing at the intersection of both intelligence and technology. This policy paper is an attempt at discussing an issue I am quite familiar with, GNSS jamming as a hybrid threat, using my engineering skills to further enhance the content.

The topic also extends beyond this paper. During my exchange in Tromsø, I have taken courses in space engineering and am currently working on a satellite-based GNSS jammer detection project.

Transparency: method and use of AI

The analysis, arguments and recommendations in this paper are my own. AI was used as an assistant for research and code, never to decide what the paper says.

Part My work AI assistance
Argument and recommendations All of it None
Text All of it None
Research Selecting the sources and building the argument from them Initial research partly assisted by the deep-research features of Claude Opus 5.5 and ChatGPT 6.1 Sol
Page design The general look of the page None
Interactive figures Deciding what each figure shows, reviewing the results, checking the geometry and physics they compute Coded with Claude Code (Claude Opus 5.5, Anthropic)

I take full responsibility for the content of this article, including any errors.

In brief

Just a small spillover

Tuesday, September 16, 2025, a Widerøe Dash-8 plane is flying from Vadsø to Vardø, in the North-East of Norway. Clouds are low, visibility is small and the pilot hence depends on the GPS system in order to land safely. But, on this day, no GPS signal properly reached the plane. The crew quickly diverted to Båtsfjord in order to perform an emergency landing only to learn what had happened a few hours later.

Across the border, Russia was holding major war games and exercises on the western shores of the Sredny Peninsula, not far from Vardø. Part of the strategic “Zapad-2025”, these exercises included Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) jamming who “spilled” into the Norwegian air space (Eye on the Arctic 2025)Eye on the Arctic. 2025. “GPS Interference Forces Plane to Abort Landing in Arctic Norway.” Radio Canada International, September 18. www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2025/09/18/gps-interference-forces-plane-to-abort-landing-in-arctic-norway/.Open source In bibliography.

While this incident made the news, it is far from an isolated case: in 2023, Norway registered a total of 294 days with at least one navigation disruption over Finnmark, against only 6 in 2019 (Nkom 2024)Nkom. 2024. “Betydelig økning i gps-jamming over Finnmark.” Press release, April 12. nkom.no/aktuelt/betydelig-okning-gps-jamming-finnmark.Open source In bibliography.

From nuisance to routine: the problem in Finnmark

GNSS jamming (which includes GPS jamming) consists in overwhelming GNSS receivers with powerful radio signals at the same frequencies as the ones used by GPS, BeiDou or Galileo constellations. The receiver is then unable to accurately calculate its position, whether it is a terrestrial vehicule, an aircraft or even a simple mobile phone.

Figure 1

What GNSS jamming does to a receiver

ANormal: the receiver hears the satellites

Satellites, ~20,000 km up (not to scale)Very weak signalsfrom far away✓ Position found

BJammed: noise drowns them out

Satellites, ~20,000 km up (not to scale)Jammer: loud noiseon the same frequency✕ No position
Satellite navigation signals travel about 20,000 km and arrive weaker than the natural radio noise around us; receivers can only pick them out because they know exactly what to listen for. A jammer broadcasts noise on the same frequency from much closer. Even a modest one far away arrives so much louder that the receiver can no longer find the satellites, and cannot compute a position.Power levels: author’s free-space calculation at GPS L1 (1,575.42 MHz), using the minimum GPS signal power at the receiver (−128.5 dBm) and a 10 W jammer 100 km away (−96.4 dBm). Illustrative; real jammers range from under 1 W to hundreds of watts.

Over Finnmark, jamming became routine after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine: 18 days in 2021, 122 in 2022 and 294 in 2023 (Nkom 2024)Nkom. 2024. “Betydelig økning i gps-jamming over Finnmark.” Press release, April 12. nkom.no/aktuelt/betydelig-okning-gps-jamming-finnmark.Open source In bibliography. In September 2024, the Norwegian Communications Authority (Nkom) stopped collecting reports because disruption was near-constant (Hansen and Jonassen 2024)Hansen, Birgitte Annie, and Trine Jonassen. 2024. “Stops Registering GPS Disruptions in Finnmark, Northern Norway.” High North News, September 27. en.highnorthnews.com/politics/stops-registering-gps-disruptions-in-finnmark-northern-norway/212107.Open source In bibliography and in 2025, Norwegian scheduled flights reported interference five times more often than the 2022 to 2024 average, mostly over Finnmark (Luftfartstilsynet 2026)Luftfartstilsynet. 2026. “Norske flysikkerhetsresultater 2025.” www.luftfartstilsynet.no/aktorer/norske-flysikkerhetsresultater/norske-flysikkerhetsresultater-2025/.Open source In bibliography.

Figure 2

Days with GNSS disruption over Finnmark, 2019–2024

Days with registered GNSS disruption over Finnmark, 2019 to 20246 days in 2019, 22 in 2020, 18 in 2021, 122 in 2022, 294 in 2023. In 2024, 44 days by 22 February, after which Norway stopped counting.0100200300days per yearInvasion of Ukraine, Feb 20226201922202018202112220222942023≥442024counting stopped
Show the data as a table
YearDays with disruption
20196
202022
202118
2022122
2023294
2024≥ 44 (to 22 Feb)
Days per year on which Norway's communications regulator registered GNSS disruption in Finnmark airspace. The 2024 bar stops on 22 February; Norway stopped collecting reports in September 2024 because disruption was near-constant.Sources: (Nkom 2024)Nkom. 2024. “Betydelig økning i gps-jamming over Finnmark.” Press release, April 12. nkom.no/aktuelt/betydelig-okning-gps-jamming-finnmark.Open source In bibliography; (The Barents Observer 2024b)The Barents Observer. 2024b. “Russian Jamming Is Now Messing Up GPS Signals for Norwegian Aviation Practically Every Day.” February 26. www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/russian-jamming-is-now-messing-up-gps-signals-for-norwegian-aviation-practically-every-day/163663.Open source In bibliography; (Hansen and Jonassen 2024)Hansen, Birgitte Annie, and Trine Jonassen. 2024. “Stops Registering GPS Disruptions in Finnmark, Northern Norway.” High North News, September 27. en.highnorthnews.com/politics/stops-registering-gps-disruptions-in-finnmark-northern-norway/212107.Open source In bibliography.

There interferences are also getting lower in altitude and more dangerous. Nkom reported spoofing (instead of simply drowning the signal, it attempts at making it report a false position) near Kirkenes in January 2025 (Nkom 2025a)Nkom. 2025a. “Har avdekket alvorlige GPS-forstyrrelser i Øst-Finnmark.” Press release, January 17. nkom.no/aktuelt/har-avdekket-alvorlige-gps-forstyrrelser-i-ost-finnmark.Open source In bibliography, then interference down to 150 m in eastern Sør-Varanger, affecting helicopters, cars and phones (Nkom 2025b)Nkom. 2025b. “Har avdekket nye alvorlige GPS-forstyrrelser i Øst-Finnmark.” Press release, June 13. nkom.no/aktuelt/har-avdekket-nye-alvorlige-gps-forstyrrelser-i-ost-finnmark.Open source In bibliography. Police, rescue services and the Coast Guard, notably in the Barents sea, report problems (The Barents Observer 2024b; High North News 2025)The Barents Observer. 2024b. “Russian Jamming Is Now Messing Up GPS Signals for Norwegian Aviation Practically Every Day.” February 26. www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/russian-jamming-is-now-messing-up-gps-signals-for-norwegian-aviation-practically-every-day/163663.Open source In bibliographyHigh North News. 2025. “No New Signs of GPS Interference in the Barents Sea.” August 27. en.highnorthnews.com/politics/no-new-signs-of-gps-interference-in-the-barents-sea/238521.Open source In bibliography, and even Svalbard airspace has had a warning (Nilsen 2025)Nilsen, Thomas. 2025. “Someone Is Messing with GPS Signals in Svalbard Airspace.” The Barents Observer, July 19. www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/someone-is-messing-with-gps-signals-in-svalbard-airspace/433658.Open source In bibliography.

Figure 3Interactive

Map of sites targetted by interference, their suspected source areas alongside France presence in Arctic Norway

Tap a symbol for details · pinch or scroll to zoom · drag to pan

All 21 map points as a list
PlaceWhat happenedSource
Kirkenes Airport (Høybuktmoen)2025–202610 km from the Russian border. First spoofing measured on the Norwegian side (17 Jan 2025); interference measured down to 1,800–2,000 ft by March 2026.(Nkom 2025a)Nkom. 2025a. “Har avdekket alvorlige GPS-forstyrrelser i Øst-Finnmark.” Press release, January 17. nkom.no/aktuelt/har-avdekket-alvorlige-gps-forstyrrelser-i-ost-finnmark.Open source In bibliography
Vadsø Airport2024One of the East Finnmark airports named in near-daily GNSS disruption reports.(The Barents Observer 2024b)The Barents Observer. 2024b. “Russian Jamming Is Now Messing Up GPS Signals for Norwegian Aviation Practically Every Day.” February 26. www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/russian-jamming-is-now-messing-up-gps-signals-for-norwegian-aviation-practically-every-day/163663.Open source In bibliography
Vardø Airport (Svartnes)16 Sep 202516 Sept 2025: a Widerøe Dash-8 from Vadsø aborted its landing (jamming plus low cloud) and diverted to Båtsfjord, during Zapad-2025 drills.(Eye on the Arctic 2025)Eye on the Arctic. 2025. “GPS Interference Forces Plane to Abort Landing in Arctic Norway.” Radio Canada International, September 18. www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2025/09/18/gps-interference-forces-plane-to-abort-landing-in-arctic-norway/.Open source In bibliography
Båtsfjord Airport2024–2025Affected airport and the diversion field for the aborted Vardø landing.(The Barents Observer 2024b)The Barents Observer. 2024b. “Russian Jamming Is Now Messing Up GPS Signals for Norwegian Aviation Practically Every Day.” February 26. www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/russian-jamming-is-now-messing-up-gps-signals-for-norwegian-aviation-practically-every-day/163663.Open source In bibliography
Berlevåg Airport2024Named among the airports affected by near-daily disruption.(The Barents Observer 2024b)The Barents Observer. 2024b. “Russian Jamming Is Now Messing Up GPS Signals for Norwegian Aviation Practically Every Day.” February 26. www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/russian-jamming-is-now-messing-up-gps-signals-for-norwegian-aviation-practically-every-day/163663.Open source In bibliography
Mehamn AirportOct–Nov 2018GNSS disruption from 24 Oct to 7 Nov 2018, around NATO's Trident Juncture.(CSIS Aerospace Security Project n.d.)CSIS Aerospace Security Project. n.d. “Arctic Circle GPS Jamming.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. aerospace.csis.org/data/gps-jamming-in-the-arctic-circle/.Open source In bibliography
LyngenOct 2018Signal losses reported 381 km from the Russian border during Trident Juncture 2018, showing the reach of high-power jamming.(CSIS Aerospace Security Project n.d.)CSIS Aerospace Security Project. n.d. “Arctic Circle GPS Jamming.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. aerospace.csis.org/data/gps-jamming-in-the-arctic-circle/.Open source In bibliography
Longyearbyen Airport (Svalbard)Jul 20258 July 2025: NOTAM for jamming and spoofing below 9,500 ft. Over 1,100 km from Kola; source unknown.(Nilsen 2025)Nilsen, Thomas. 2025. “Someone Is Messing with GPS Signals in Svalbard Airspace.” The Barents Observer, July 19. www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/someone-is-messing-with-gps-signals-in-svalbard-airspace/433658.Open source In bibliography
Varanger PeninsulaApr–May 2026Nkom measures daily interference down to ~600 m (2,000 ft). Two new permanent monitoring stations added in May 2026.(High North News 2026b)High North News. 2026b. “Serious GPS Disruptions in East Finnmark: Russian Activity Creates Navigation Challenges.” April 28. en.highnorthnews.com/business/gps-disruptions-at-lower-altitudes-close-to-norways-border-to-russia/1110164.Open source In bibliography
Eastern Sør-Varanger13 Jun 2025Spoofing and jamming measured down to 150 m, affecting helicopters, cars, phones and watches.(Nkom 2025b)Nkom. 2025b. “Har avdekket nye alvorlige GPS-forstyrrelser i Øst-Finnmark.” Press release, June 13. nkom.no/aktuelt/har-avdekket-nye-alvorlige-gps-forstyrrelser-i-ost-finnmark.Open source In bibliography
Barents Sea, Kirkenes–BåtsfjordAug 2025Coast Guard (KV Barentshav), Coastal Administration and Telenor Coastal Radio reported jamming and spoofing at sea.(High North News 2025)High North News. 2025. “No New Signs of GPS Interference in the Barents Sea.” August 27. en.highnorthnews.com/politics/no-new-signs-of-gps-interference-in-the-barents-sea/238521.Open source In bibliography
SvalSat, Galileo stationHosts a Galileo sensor and uplink station for Europe's navigation system, plus Copernicus data downlinks.(European Space Agency n.d.)European Space Agency. n.d. “Managing Signals at the Top of the World.” www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Preparing_for_the_Future/Space_for_Earth/Arctic/Managing_signals_at_the_top_of_the_world.Open source In bibliography
Jammertest, Bleik (Andøya)14–18 Sep 2026Open, legal test range for jamming, spoofing and meaconing every September (230 participants from 29 countries in 2024).(Gerrard et al. 2026)Gerrard, Nicolai, Tor Atle Solend, Anders Rødningsby, et al. 2026. “Jammertest: An Open GNSS Interference Test Arena to Accelerate the Development of Resilient GNSS Applications.” Engineering Proceedings 126 (1): 20. doi.org/10.3390/engproc2026126020.Open DOI In bibliography
Ørland Air BaseJan 2026French Navy Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft deployed from 13 Jan 2026 for High North operations.(Marine nationale 2026)Marine nationale. 2026. “Norvège – Déploiement d’un avion de patrouille maritime Atlantique 2 (ATL2).” Ministère des Armées, January 22. www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/actualites/norvege-deploiement-dun-avion-patrouille-maritime-atlantique-2-atl2.Open source In bibliography
SetermoenMar 2026French Foreign Legion (2e REI, 1er REC) during Cold Response 26, 9–19 March 2026 (32,000 troops, 14 nations).(High North News 2026a)High North News. 2026a. “Cold Response 2026: Over 30,000 from 14 Nations Exercise Defending the Northern Nordic Region.” March 10. en.highnorthnews.com/politics/cold-response-2026-over-30000-from-14-nations-exercise-defending-the-northern-nordic-region/1106150.Open source In bibliography
AWIPEV, Ny-ÅlesundFrench-German Arctic research base run by France's Polar Institute (IPEV) and Germany's AWI.(AWIPEV n.d.)AWIPEV. n.d. “AWIPEV: The French-German Arctic Research Base at Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard.” www.awipev.eu/.Open source In bibliography
French cod fishery (approx. area)The French freezer trawler Emeraude (Euronor / Compagnie des Pêches) fishes cod and haddock in the Barents Sea and around Svalbard.(Marine Stewardship Council n.d.)Marine Stewardship Council. n.d. “Pêcherie de cabillaud et d’églefin d’Arctique Nord-Est.” www.msc.org/fr/nos-actions/notre-approche/les-pecheries-engagees/pecherie-cabillaud-eglefin.Open source In bibliography
Pechenga military areaAbout 50 km from Kirkenes airport. Base of motorised and naval infantry units; named by Nkom among areas protected by Russian electronic warfare.(The Barents Observer 2024a)The Barents Observer. 2024a. “Intensified GPS Jamming Is Side Effect of Russia’s Self-Protection of Kola Bases.” May 31. www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/intensified-gps-jamming-is-side-effect-of-russias-selfprotection-of-kola-bases/166119.Open source In bibliography
Olenya air baseStrategic bomber base south of Murmansk, struck by Ukrainian drones on 1 June 2025. Jamming around it is described as drone self-defence.(The Barents Observer 2024a)The Barents Observer. 2024a. “Intensified GPS Jamming Is Side Effect of Russia’s Self-Protection of Kola Bases.” May 31. www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/intensified-gps-jamming-is-side-effect-of-russias-selfprotection-of-kola-bases/166119.Open source In bibliography
SeveromorskNorthern Fleet headquarters, home of Russia's sea-based nuclear forces.(The Barents Observer 2024a)The Barents Observer. 2024a. “Intensified GPS Jamming Is Side Effect of Russia’s Self-Protection of Kola Bases.” May 31. www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/intensified-gps-jamming-is-side-effect-of-russias-selfprotection-of-kola-bases/166119.Open source In bibliography
Sredny Peninsula (Zapad-2025)12–16 Sep 2025Zapad-2025 drills, 12–16 September 2025, coinciding with the aborted landing at Vardø.(Eye on the Arctic 2025)Eye on the Arctic. 2025. “GPS Interference Forces Plane to Abort Landing in Arctic Norway.” Radio Canada International, September 18. www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2025/09/18/gps-interference-forces-plane-to-abort-landing-in-arctic-norway/.Open source In bibliography
Symbols are sites named in official or press reports; dashed circles are zones where Norway's regulator measured interference. Filter by category or switch extent. Russian sites are areas associated with electronic-warfare self-defence, not confirmed emitter positions.Base map: Natural Earth 1:10m. Sources for each point are in the list below the map.

The jamming attempts come mostly from the Kola Peninsula. While Nkom describes the jamming as “a spillover effect” of Russia protecting its bases against Ukrainian drones (The Barents Observer 2024a)The Barents Observer. 2024a. “Intensified GPS Jamming Is Side Effect of Russia’s Self-Protection of Kola Bases.” May 31. www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/intensified-gps-jamming-is-side-effect-of-russias-selfprotection-of-kola-bases/166119.Open source In bibliography, it remains especially difficult to state whether the disruptions are intended or not.

Figure 4Interactive

Timeline: interference incidents and responses alongside France's involvment in Arctic Norway

26 of 26 events

  1. 2017

    1. Interference incidents

      First major episode during Russia's Zapad-2017

      Widerøe and others lose GNSS across Finnmark and up to 600 km away while Russia holds its Zapad exercise. (CSIS Aerospace Security Project n.d.)CSIS Aerospace Security Project. n.d. “Arctic Circle GPS Jamming.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. aerospace.csis.org/data/gps-jamming-in-the-arctic-circle/.Open source In bibliography

  2. 2018

    1. Interference incidents

      Jamming around NATO's Trident Juncture

      NOTAM for Kirkenes; Mehamn disrupted for two weeks; losses reported as far west as Lyngen. (CSIS Aerospace Security Project n.d.)CSIS Aerospace Security Project. n.d. “Arctic Circle GPS Jamming.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. aerospace.csis.org/data/gps-jamming-in-the-arctic-circle/.Open source In bibliography

  3. 2019

    1. Norwegian responses

      Norway protests formally to Moscow

      Oslo gathers evidence placing the emitters on Kola and raises five episodes in 17 months. Disruption stops after bilateral talks in June 2019. (Spansvoll 2023)Course readingSpansvoll, Runar. 2023. “Studying Moscow’s Coercive Campaign Against Norway: The Bear Is Awake.” The RUSI Journal 168 (3): 74–85. doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2220756.Open DOI In bibliography

  4. 2022

    1. Russian context

      Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine

      Disruption days over Finnmark jump from 18 in 2021 to 122 in 2022. (Nkom 2024)Nkom. 2024. “Betydelig økning i gps-jamming over Finnmark.” Press release, April 12. nkom.no/aktuelt/betydelig-okning-gps-jamming-finnmark.Open source In bibliography

  5. 2023

    1. Interference incidents

      294 days of disruption in one year

      Nkom registers GNSS disruption over Finnmark on 294 days, 48 times more than in 2019. (Nkom 2024)Nkom. 2024. “Betydelig økning i gps-jamming over Finnmark.” Press release, April 12. nkom.no/aktuelt/betydelig-okning-gps-jamming-finnmark.Open source In bibliography

  6. 2024

    1. Interference incidents

      44 disruption days in under two months

      Police and search-and-rescue in East Finnmark report operational impact. (The Barents Observer 2024b)The Barents Observer. 2024b. “Russian Jamming Is Now Messing Up GPS Signals for Norwegian Aviation Practically Every Day.” February 26. www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/russian-jamming-is-now-messing-up-gps-signals-for-norwegian-aviation-practically-every-day/163663.Open source In bibliography

    2. Russian context

      Spillover from Kola base defence

      Nkom links the surge to Russian electromagnetic self-protection of Kola bases against Ukrainian drones. (The Barents Observer 2024a)The Barents Observer. 2024a. “Intensified GPS Jamming Is Side Effect of Russia’s Self-Protection of Kola Bases.” May 31. www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/intensified-gps-jamming-is-side-effect-of-russias-selfprotection-of-kola-bases/166119.Open source In bibliography

    3. Norwegian responses

      Norway stops counting

      Interference is now near-constant, so Nkom stops requesting reports from Finnmark. (Hansen and Jonassen 2024)Hansen, Birgitte Annie, and Trine Jonassen. 2024. “Stops Registering GPS Disruptions in Finnmark, Northern Norway.” High North News, September 27. en.highnorthnews.com/politics/stops-registering-gps-disruptions-in-finnmark-northern-norway/212107.Open source In bibliography

  7. 2025

    1. Interference incidents

      First spoofing on the Norwegian side

      An SAS crew is spoofed on approach to Kirkenes; Nkom measures manipulation near 4,500 ft. (Nkom 2025a)Nkom. 2025a. “Har avdekket alvorlige GPS-forstyrrelser i Øst-Finnmark.” Press release, January 17. nkom.no/aktuelt/har-avdekket-alvorlige-gps-forstyrrelser-i-ost-finnmark.Open source In bibliography

    2. Interference incidents

      Interference reaches 150 m

      Spoofing and jamming measured close to the ground in eastern Sør-Varanger. (Nkom 2025b)Nkom. 2025b. “Har avdekket nye alvorlige GPS-forstyrrelser i Øst-Finnmark.” Press release, June 13. nkom.no/aktuelt/har-avdekket-nye-alvorlige-gps-forstyrrelser-i-ost-finnmark.Open source In bibliography

    3. Interference incidents

      Svalbard airspace affected

      NOTAM for jamming and spoofing below 9,500 ft at Longyearbyen; source unknown. (Nilsen 2025)Nilsen, Thomas. 2025. “Someone Is Messing with GPS Signals in Svalbard Airspace.” The Barents Observer, July 19. www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/someone-is-messing-with-gps-signals-in-svalbard-airspace/433658.Open source In bibliography

    4. International responses

      EU sanctions a Russian EW unit

      The EU lists Kaliningrad's 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center under its hybrid-threats regime. (Council of the European Union 2025)Council of the European Union. 2025. “Russian Hybrid Threats: EU Lists Nine Individuals and Six Entities Responsible for Destabilising Actions in the EU and Ukraine.” July 15. www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/15/russian-hybrid-threats-eu-lists-nine-individuals-and-six-entities-responsible-for-destabilising-actions-in-the-eu-and-ukraine/.Open source In bibliography

    5. Interference incidents

      Jamming reported at sea

      Coast Guard and Coastal Administration report interference between Kirkenes and Båtsfjord. (High North News 2025)High North News. 2025. “No New Signs of GPS Interference in the Barents Sea.” August 27. en.highnorthnews.com/politics/no-new-signs-of-gps-interference-in-the-barents-sea/238521.Open source In bibliography

    6. Interference incidents

      Aborted landing at Vardø

      A Widerøe Dash-8 diverts to Båtsfjord as Russia's Zapad-2025 drills run on the Sredny Peninsula. (Eye on the Arctic 2025)Eye on the Arctic. 2025. “GPS Interference Forces Plane to Abort Landing in Arctic Norway.” Radio Canada International, September 18. www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2025/09/18/gps-interference-forces-plane-to-abort-landing-in-arctic-norway/.Open source In bibliography

    7. International responses

      ICAO condemns Russia

      The ICAO Assembly condemns GNSS interference originating from Russia and North Korea. (ICAO 2025)ICAO. 2025. “ICAO Assembly Condemns GNSS Radio Frequency Interference Originating from the DPRK and the Russian Federation.” October 3. www.icao.int/news/icao-assembly-condemns-gnss-radio-frequency-interference-originating-dprk-and-russian.Open source In bibliography

  8. 2026

    1. France

      French ATL2 deploys to Ørland

      A French Navy maritime patrol aircraft begins High North operations from Norway. (Marine nationale 2026)Marine nationale. 2026. “Norvège – Déploiement d’un avion de patrouille maritime Atlantique 2 (ATL2).” Ministère des Armées, January 22. www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/actualites/norvege-deploiement-dun-avion-patrouille-maritime-atlantique-2-atl2.Open source In bibliography

    2. International responses

      NATO launches Arctic Sentry

      Allied High North activity is brought under Joint Force Command Norfolk. (USNI News 2026)USNI News. 2026. “NATO Launches Arctic Sentry in High North in Response to Russian Activity.” February 16. news.usni.org/2026/02/16/nato-launches-arctic-sentry-in-high-north-in-response-to-russian-activity.Open source In bibliography

    3. France

      French troops in Cold Response 26

      Foreign Legion units train in northern Norway among 32,000 troops from 14 nations. (High North News 2026a)High North News. 2026a. “Cold Response 2026: Over 30,000 from 14 Nations Exercise Defending the Northern Nordic Region.” March 10. en.highnorthnews.com/politics/cold-response-2026-over-30000-from-14-nations-exercise-defending-the-northern-nordic-region/1106150.Open source In bibliography

    4. Interference incidents

      Jamming down to 1,800 ft

      Interference near Kirkenes now reaches 1,800–2,000 ft, down from 4,000 ft the winter before. (Nilsen 2026)Nilsen, Thomas. 2026. “Jamming Now Occurring at Lower Altitudes.” The Barents Observer, March 12. www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/jamming-now-occurring-at-lower-altitudes/446780.Open source In bibliography

    5. Norwegian responses

      Norway plans an ITU complaint

      Daily interference down to about 600 m over Varanger; police advise carrying map and compass. (High North News 2026b)High North News. 2026b. “Serious GPS Disruptions in East Finnmark: Russian Activity Creates Navigation Challenges.” April 28. en.highnorthnews.com/business/gps-disruptions-at-lower-altitudes-close-to-norways-border-to-russia/1110164.Open source In bibliography

    6. Norwegian responses

      Two new monitoring stations

      Nkom adds two permanent GNSS monitoring stations in East Finnmark to the three already running. (Nkom 2026)Nkom. 2026. “Nkom styrker tilstedeværelsen i Finnmark for å overvåke GNSS-forstyrrelser.” Press release, May 21. nkom.no/aktuelt/nkom-styrker-tilstedevaerelsen-i-finnmark-for-a-overvake-gnss-forstyrrelser.Open source In bibliography

    7. France

      Narvik Arrangement signed

      France and Norway agree mutual assistance and cooperation on hybrid threats, space, maritime security and the Arctic. (Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2026)Norwegian Ministry of Defence. 2026. “Norway and France Sign Mutual Defence Agreement.” May 27. www.regjeringen.no/en/whats-new/norway-and-france-sign-mutual-defence-agreement/id3161369/.Open source In bibliography

    8. Space & technology

      Jamming from orbit

      Researchers show Russian EKS satellites have emitted GPS-jamming bursts over Europe since 2019. (UT Austin Radionavigation Laboratory 2026)UT Austin Radionavigation Laboratory. 2026. “Russian Satellites Caught Jamming GPS in Europe.” June. radionavlab.ae.utexas.edu/russian-satellites-caught-jamming-gps-across-europe/.Open source In bibliography

    9. Space & technology

      Unseenlabs launches its Gen 2 satellite

      The Rennes firm's BRO-31 lists GNSS jammers among the emitters it can detect and locate. (Unseenlabs 2026)Unseenlabs. 2026. “Gen 2: Space-Based RF for Multi-Domain Awareness.” unseenlabs.com/en/gen-2/.Open source In bibliography

    10. France

      DGA awards CASSIOPÉE

      Airbus DS and Unseenlabs will build France's next space signals-intelligence system, operational by 2032. (Actu Forces de l’Ordre 2026)Actu Forces de l’Ordre. 2026. “Le contrat CASSIOPÉE attribué à Airbus Defence and Space et Unseenlabs doit succéder aux satellites CERES.” September 11. actuforcesdelordre.fr/2026/09/11/le-contrat-cassiopee-attribue-a-airbus-defence-and-space-et-unseenlabs-doit-succeder-aux-satellites/.Open source In bibliography

    11. Space & technology

      Jammertest 2026

      Norway's open jamming and spoofing test week at Andøya. (Jammertest 2026)Jammertest. 2026. “Jammertest 2026.” www.jammertest.no/jammertest-2026/.Open source In bibliography

Key incidents and responses, 2017–2026. Filter by category; “Show on map” moves Figure 3 to the place.

Spillover by design

Whether the jamming is deliberate is not an academic question: it decides what Norway, and its allies, can do about it.

Since 2014, Russia has pressed its western neighbour with hybrid operations, kept below the threshold of armed conflict because Norway’s NATO membership rules out anything larger (Spansvoll 2023, 74)Course readingSpansvoll, Runar. 2023. “Studying Moscow’s Coercive Campaign Against Norway: The Bear Is Awake.” The RUSI Journal 168 (3): 74–85. doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2220756.Open DOI In bibliography. Moscow does not hide the logic: “Norway is a member of NATO, and NATO is not a friend of Russia”, Sergey Lavrov told his Norwegian counterpart in 2021 (Spansvoll 2023, 76)Course readingSpansvoll, Runar. 2023. “Studying Moscow’s Coercive Campaign Against Norway: The Bear Is Awake.” The RUSI Journal 168 (3): 74–85. doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2220756.Open DOI In bibliography. GNSS jamming fits this toolbox perfectly. It operates below the threshold of detection and, more importantly, below the threshold of attribution. For Spansvoll, Russia “routinely disrupts Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers in northern Norway as a means of political and military signalling” (Spansvoll 2023, 84)Course readingSpansvoll, Runar. 2023. “Studying Moscow’s Coercive Campaign Against Norway: The Bear Is Awake.” The RUSI Journal 168 (3): 74–85. doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2220756.Open DOI In bibliography.

Seen this way, the “spillover” explanation is part of the weapon. Hoogensen Gjørv defines hybrid threats as activities “designed to obscure intent” that fall mainly on civilians (Hoogensen Gjørv 2026, 175)Course readingHoogensen Gjørv, Gunhild. 2026. “Geopolitics and Hybrid Threats: The Reconfiguration of Arctic Exceptionalism?” Chap. 11 in A Research Agenda for Arctic Security and Governance, edited by Marc Jacobsen and Elana Wilson Rowe. Edward Elgar. www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/book/9781035318612/chapter11.xml.Open source In bibliography, which is exactly what Finnmark’s pilots, police officers and rescue crews live with. Stensrud and Østhagen note that Oslo has rarely accused Moscow outright, and suggest this may be “the point of such hybrid operations” (Stensrud and Østhagen 2024, 121)Course readingStensrud, Cecilie Juul, and Andreas Østhagen. 2024. “Hybrid Warfare at Sea? Russia, Svalbard and the Arctic.” Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 7 (1): 111–30. doi.org/10.31374/sjms.233.Open DOI In bibliography: as long as doubt remains, Russia pays no price.

The answer is to remove the doubt. In 2019, “undisputable evidence” placing the emitters on Kola, backed by bilateral talks, brought disruption down to fewer than 25 days a year until the invasion of Ukraine (Spansvoll 2023, 84; Nkom 2024)Course readingSpansvoll, Runar. 2023. “Studying Moscow’s Coercive Campaign Against Norway: The Bear Is Awake.” The RUSI Journal 168 (3): 74–85. doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2220756.Open DOI In bibliographyNkom. 2024. “Betydelig økning i gps-jamming over Finnmark.” Press release, April 12. nkom.no/aktuelt/betydelig-okning-gps-jamming-finnmark.Open source In bibliography. And because Finnmark faces limited hybrid operations rather than hybrid warfare (Stensrud and Østhagen 2024, 114)Course readingStensrud, Cecilie Juul, and Andreas Østhagen. 2024. “Hybrid Warfare at Sea? Russia, Svalbard and the Arctic.” Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 7 (1): 111–30. doi.org/10.31374/sjms.233.Open DOI In bibliography, the response should stay proportionate: evidence, not force. Producing that evidence, quickly and in a form allies can share, is what France can offer.

Why Finnmark is France’s problem too

Vardø is more than 2,500 km from Paris. Why should the Direction Générale de l’Armement (lit. Directorate General of Armament) care about a regional plane missing its landing there? Because France has real stakes in these waters, because the same weapon already reaches French interests, and because Finnmark is the best place to learn how to counter it.

Strategy & Intelligence

The Kola Peninsula hosts Russia’s Northern Fleet and its sea-based nuclear arsenal (Hoogensen Gjørv 2026, 177)Course readingHoogensen Gjørv, Gunhild. 2026. “Geopolitics and Hybrid Threats: The Reconfiguration of Arctic Exceptionalism?” Chap. 11 in A Research Agenda for Arctic Security and Governance, edited by Marc Jacobsen and Elana Wilson Rowe. Edward Elgar. www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/book/9781035318612/chapter11.xml.Open source In bibliography, which makes the Norwegian and Barents Seas a priority area for tracking Russian submarines or ships that attempt to go dark. The French Navy works there: at least one Atlantique 2 patrol aircraft has flown from Ørland since January 2026, covering the Norwegian Sea and beyond the Arctic Circle (Marine nationale 2026)Marine nationale. 2026. “Norvège – Déploiement d’un avion de patrouille maritime Atlantique 2 (ATL2).” Ministère des Armées, January 22. www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/actualites/norvege-deploiement-dun-avion-patrouille-maritime-atlantique-2-atl2.Open source In bibliography, and French warships made 20 port calls in Norway in early 2026 (Lagneau 2026c)Lagneau, Laurent. 2026c. “La Norvège se rallie au concept de « dissuasion avancée » et signe un accord d’assistance mutuelle avec la France.” Zone Militaire (opex360.com), May 28. www.opex360.com/2026/05/28/la-norvege-se-rallie-au-concept-de-dissuasion-avancee-et-signe-un-accord-dassistance-mutuelle-avec-la-france/.Open source In bibliography. France unveiled its Arctic Defence Strategy in July 2025 claiming the region is key to its freedom of action at sea and to the ocean component of its nuclear deterrence (Ministère des Armées 2025)Ministère des Armées. 2025. Stratégie de défense pour l’Arctique. Strategy document. Ministère des Armées. www.defense.gouv.fr/dgris/enjeux-regionaux/poles/strategie-defense-larctique-fruk.Open source In bibliography. Civilian interests follow: a French trawler fishes cod around Svalbard (Marine Stewardship Council n.d.)Marine Stewardship Council. n.d. “Pêcherie de cabillaud et d’églefin d’Arctique Nord-Est.” www.msc.org/fr/nos-actions/notre-approche/les-pecheries-engagees/pecherie-cabillaud-eglefin.Open source In bibliography, French scientists work at the AWIPEV base in Ny-Ålesund (AWIPEV n.d.)AWIPEV. n.d. “AWIPEV: The French-German Arctic Research Base at Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard.” www.awipev.eu/.Open source In bibliography, and Europe’s Galileo system relies on a station on Svalbard (European Space Agency n.d.)European Space Agency. n.d. “Managing Signals at the Top of the World.” www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Preparing_for_the_Future/Space_for_Earth/Arctic/Managing_signals_at_the_top_of_the_world.Open source In bibliography. All of which depend on satellite navigation.

Deterrence & Response

France is also already a target. In 2022, the head of satellite navigation at the French civil aviation authority warned that a single jamming truck “could cut out a quarter of French skies” (Euronews 2022)Euronews. 2022. “Russia Responsible for GPS Jamming in Europe, French Air Safety Official Claims.” April 1. www.euronews.com/next/2022/04/01/russia-responsible-for-gps-jamming-in-europe-french-air-safety-official-claims.Open source In bibliography. Reports of Russian interefences with Eutelsat satellites has already pushed Paris to complain to the ITU (The Record 2024)The Record. 2024. “UN Urges Russia to `Immediately’ Cease Interference in European Satellites.” July 2. therecord.media/un-russia-satellite-interference-europe.Open source In bibliography, and Russian satellites have been caught emitting GPS-jamming bursts over Europe (UT Austin Radionavigation Laboratory 2026)UT Austin Radionavigation Laboratory. 2026. “Russian Satellites Caught Jamming GPS in Europe.” June. radionavlab.ae.utexas.edu/russian-satellites-caught-jamming-gps-across-europe/.Open source In bibliography. On Norwegian mainland, NATO’s actions already include French units and jamming also weakens the GPS-guided weapons they carry, “reducing the overall deterrence effect” of allied arsenals (Spansvoll 2023, 84)Course readingSpansvoll, Runar. 2023. “Studying Moscow’s Coercive Campaign Against Norway: The Bear Is Awake.” The RUSI Journal 168 (3): 74–85. doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2220756.Open DOI In bibliography.

Prevention & Training

Paradoxically, France’s Arctic defence strategy of July 2025 never clearly mentions GNSS, jamming or electronic warfare (Ministère des Armées 2025)Ministère des Armées. 2025. Stratégie de défense pour l’Arctique. Strategy document. Ministère des Armées. www.defense.gouv.fr/dgris/enjeux-regionaux/poles/strategie-defense-larctique-fruk.Open source In bibliography. French law also prevents military jamming on national territory. This means units and manufacturers rarely train or test in real conditions (L’Essentiel de l’Éco 2026; Lemaire and Tesson 2026)L’Essentiel de l’Éco. 2026. “Pourquoi l’armée française ne peut pas s’entraı̂ner à la guerre réelle.” March 11. lessentieldeleco.fr/6286-pourquoi-larmee-francaise-ne-peut-pas-sentrainer-a-la-guerre-reelle/.Open source In bibliographyLemaire, Didier, and Thierry Tesson. 2026. Rapport d’information sur la guerre électronique. Rapport d’information 2507 (17e législature). Assemblée nationale, Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées. www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/17/rapports/cion_def/l17b2507_rapport-information.Open source In bibliography. In Finnmark, the threat is real, measured daily by a regulator that also hosts an open test range and war games at Andøya (Lofoten). For France, it is the closest thing to a live laboratory.

Diplomacy & Collaboration

The Narvik Arrangement, signed in Paris on 27 May 2026, confirms that both France and Norway see the benefit (Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2026)Norwegian Ministry of Defence. 2026. “Norway and France Sign Mutual Defence Agreement.” May 27. www.regjeringen.no/en/whats-new/norway-and-france-sign-mutual-defence-agreement/id3161369/.Open source In bibliography. One one hand, Norway gains a second European pillar, which its defence minister called “an important part of our hedging strategy” (Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2026)Norwegian Ministry of Defence. 2026. “Norway and France Sign Mutual Defence Agreement.” May 27. www.regjeringen.no/en/whats-new/norway-and-france-sign-mutual-defence-agreement/id3161369/.Open source In bibliography, and access to the only space-based signals intelligence in Europe (Lagneau 2026b)Lagneau, Laurent. 2026b. “La DGA a relancé le projet de satellite de renseignement électromagnétique CELESTE.” Zone Militaire (opex360.com), March 1. www.opex360.com/2026/03/01/la-dga-a-relance-le-projet-de-satellite-de-renseignement-electromagnetique-celeste/.Open source In bibliography. On the other hand, France gains a testing ground, shared data and a seat in High North security, confirmed by Norway joining its “advanced deterrence” project (Lagneau 2026c)Lagneau, Laurent. 2026c. “La Norvège se rallie au concept de « dissuasion avancée » et signe un accord d’assistance mutuelle avec la France.” Zone Militaire (opex360.com), May 28. www.opex360.com/2026/05/28/la-norvege-se-rallie-au-concept-de-dissuasion-avancee-et-signe-un-accord-dassistance-mutuelle-avec-la-france/.Open source In bibliography. Prime Minister Støre and President Macron defined hybrid threats, space and maritime security as common priorities (Ambassade de France en Norvège 2026)Ambassade de France en Norvège. 2026. “Arrangement de Narvik – une nouvelle étape dans le partenariat stratégique entre la France et la Norvège.” May. no.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/arrangement-de-narvik-une-nouvelle-etape-dans-le-partenariat-strategique-entre-la-france-et-la.Open source In bibliography, making jamming in Finnmark a key issue to tackle.

Figure 5

Signing the Narvik Arrangement, Paris, 27 May 2026

Two ministers sign documents at a table in an Élysée salon while Jonas Gahr Støre and Emmanuel Macron stand behind them at lecterns, between Norwegian, French and EU flags.
Back, left to right: Norway's Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and President Emmanuel Macron. Front, signing: Norway's Minister of Defence Tore O. Sandvik and France's Minister for the Armed Forces and Veterans Catherine Vautrin.Photo: Christian Liewig / Office of the Prime Minister of Norway. Source: (Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2026)Norwegian Ministry of Defence. 2026. “Norway and France Sign Mutual Defence Agreement.” May 27. www.regjeringen.no/en/whats-new/norway-and-france-sign-mutual-defence-agreement/id3161369/.Open source In bibliography.

The constraint: help without escalating

Norway’s geopolitical position forces Oslo to adopt quite a unique strategy to answer the security dilemma in the region. Oslo treats deterrence and reassurance as complementary, aiming for a “doubly stable” situation. Interestingly, Russian GPS jamming can be seen as a sign of drift towards the opposite, where “the offense has the advantage” (Knutsen and Pettersen 2024, 31)Course readingKnutsen, Bjørn Olav, and Elisabeth Pettersen. 2024. “War in Europe, but Still Low Tension in the High North? An Analysis of Norwegian Mitigation Strategies.” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 15: 25–46. doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v15.5065.Open DOI In bibliography. Indeed, “calibrat[ing] deterrence is crucial [both] to reassurance” and to remain “a predictable and responsible neighbour” in the words of Norway’s defence minister (The Barents Observer 2026b)The Barents Observer. 2026b. “Norway Softens Self-Imposed Restrictions on Allied Surveillance Aircraft Monitoring Russia’s Nuclear Fleet.” August 21. www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/norway-softens-selfimposed-restrictions-on-allied-surveillance-aircraft-monitoring-russias-nuclear-fleet/456117.Open source In bibliography.

French help should therefore be passive, defensive and transparent to Oslo.

Recommendations to the DGA

Recommendation 1

Launch VARDE: a 12-month satellite pilot mission for GNSS jammer detection and mapping over Kola and Finnmark

Lead
AID with DGA-Maîtrise de l'information, Bruz
Vehicle
Narvik Arrangement: space and hybrid-threat tracks
When
Contract Q1 2027 · first shared map mid-2027

The DGA should use an Agence de l’Innovation de Défense (lit. Defence Innovation Agency) experimentation contract to task the French start-up Unseenlabs to launch VARDE1, a 12-month pilot mission with their new Gen 2 satellite (Unseenlabs 2026)Unseenlabs. 2026. “Gen 2: Space-Based RF for Multi-Domain Awareness.” unseenlabs.com/en/gen-2/.Open source In bibliography for Finnmark and Barents Sea space-based ground GNSS jammer detection.

The feasibility of working with Andøya Space to put the required satellites in a nearly-polar orbit directly from Norway’s own ground should be explored.

The DGA should then fuse its detections with Nkom’s five ground stations (Nkom 2026; The Barents Observer 2026a)Nkom. 2026. “Nkom styrker tilstedeværelsen i Finnmark for å overvåke GNSS-forstyrrelser.” Press release, May 21. nkom.no/aktuelt/nkom-styrker-tilstedevaerelsen-i-finnmark-for-a-overvake-gnss-forstyrrelser.Open source In bibliographyThe Barents Observer. 2026a. “Norway Boosts GPS Jamming Detection amid Russian Escalation.” May 22. www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/norway-boosts-gps-jamming-detection-amid-russian-escalation/451004.Open source In bibliography and provide Norway’s Ministry of Defence a regular (target: daily) unclassified map with the precise location of GNSS jammers targetting its soil.

Figure 6Interactive

How a satellite finds a jammer

A jammer on the ground

A jammer near Pechenga, a few kilometres from the Norwegian border, floods the GPS frequency with noise. The noise does not only spread towards Finnmark: it also rises into space, where a satellite can hear it.

Loading the 3D view…

—
Doppler shift of the jammer’s GPS L1 signal as heard by the satellite. Drag across the chart to move in time.
Possible positions
—
95% area
—
Time needed
—

Interactive figure: view it online

This five-step 3D explainer follows a satellite pass, its Doppler curve and the jammer's location as it narrows down. It is made to be explored on screen, not read on paper.

brief.ravenloft.fr/#fig-3d

Five steps, from one Doppler curve to a located jammer. Step through with the tabs, play or drag through each pass, and drag the view to rotate it. Illustrative model: orbits, Doppler, TDOA and FDOA curves are computed at true scale (Earth’s rotation ignored); the sizes of the uncertainty areas are not real performance figures.Method: (Spire Global n.d.)Spire Global. n.d. “Geolocating GNSS Jammers from LEO.” spire.com/blog/space-reconnaissance/geolocating-gnss-jammers-from-leo/.Open source In bibliography. Capability claims: (Unseenlabs 2026)Unseenlabs. 2026. “Gen 2: Space-Based RF for Multi-Domain Awareness.” unseenlabs.com/en/gen-2/.Open source In bibliography; (Inside GNSS 2025)Inside GNSS. 2025. “HawkEye 360 Launches Advanced GNSS Interference Detection Capabilities to Enhance Defense and Intelligence Operations.” July 29. insidegnss.com/hawkeye-360-launches-advanced-gnss-interference-detection-capabilities-to-enhance-defense-and-intelligence-operations/.Open source In bibliography.

Recommendation 2

Calibrate it, and test French receivers, at Jammertest 2027 in Andøya

Lead
DGA Maîtrise de l'information + DGA Essais en vol
Vehicle
Norway's open test week at Andøya (Nkom, FFI, Space Agency)
When
September 2027

Jammertest is the world’s largest open test for evaluating the resilience of GNSS technlogies against, among others, jamming threats. It is held annually in Andøya and exists to foster advancements and international collaboration in GNSS resilience without relying on strict regulation. (Gerrard et al. 2026)Gerrard, Nicolai, Tor Atle Solend, Anders Rødningsby, et al. 2026. “Jammertest: An Open GNSS Interference Test Arena to Accelerate the Development of Resilient GNSS Applications.” Engineering Proceedings 126 (1): 20. doi.org/10.3390/engproc2026126020.Open DOI In bibliography

Jammertest 2027 will be the perfect opportunity to calibrate VARDE pilot mission’s satellites. The same week, DGA engineers should test the OMEGA programme’s anti-jam antennas and the new P3TS and Galileo PRS receivers (DGA 2024; Lagneau 2026a)DGA. 2024. “La DGA teste la résilience au brouillage, enjeu majeur pour les armées.” December 11. www.defense.gouv.fr/dga/actualites/dga-teste-resilience-au-brouillage-enjeu-majeur-armees.Open source In bibliographyLagneau, Laurent. 2026a. “Guerre électronique : Thales et Eviden renforcent la résilience des systèmes de navigation de l’armée de Terre.” Zone Militaire (opex360.com), July 28. www.opex360.com/2026/07/28/guerre-electronique-thales-et-eviden-renforcent-la-resilience-des-systemes-de-navigation-de-larmee-de-terre/.Open source In bibliography, which cannot face real jamming in France.

Recommendation 3

Make it sovereign: build GNSS jammer detection into CASSIOPÉE

Lead
DGA, CASSIOPÉE programme team
Vehicle
Design phase of France's next military signals-intelligence satellites (CELESTE programme)
When
2027, before the design is frozen

The VARDE pilot relies on a commercial service and stops after 12 months. To turn it into a lasting French capability, the DGA should build GNSS jammer detection into CASSIOPÉE, the military signals-intelligence satellites it awarded to Airbus Defence and Space and Unseenlabs on 11 September 2026 to replace the CERES constellation by 2032 (Actu Forces de l’Ordre 2026)Actu Forces de l’Ordre. 2026. “Le contrat CASSIOPÉE attribué à Airbus Defence and Space et Unseenlabs doit succéder aux satellites CERES.” September 11. actuforcesdelordre.fr/2026/09/11/le-contrat-cassiopee-attribue-a-airbus-defence-and-space-et-unseenlabs-doit-succeder-aux-satellites/.Open source In bibliography. The contract, as announced, does not mention jammers.

Three requirements should be added while the design is still open: listening in the GNSS frequency bands, frequent passes over high latitudes such as the Barents region, and products that can be shared with allies like Norway. Adding them now costs far less than later, in a programme already described as under-budgeted (Lagneau 2026b)Lagneau, Laurent. 2026b. “La DGA a relancé le projet de satellite de renseignement électromagnétique CELESTE.” Zone Militaire (opex360.com), March 1. www.opex360.com/2026/03/01/la-dga-a-relance-le-projet-de-satellite-de-renseignement-electromagnetique-celeste/.Open source In bibliography.

Recommendation 4

Turn detections into evidence against Russia

Lead
DGA, with the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and the SGDSN
Vehicle
ITU, EU sanctions against Russian hybrid threats
When
From mid-2027

Detection means little without consequences. Public attribution is the best answer to hybrid threats (Hoogensen Gjørv 2026, 188)Course readingHoogensen Gjørv, Gunhild. 2026. “Geopolitics and Hybrid Threats: The Reconfiguration of Arctic Exceptionalism?” Chap. 11 in A Research Agenda for Arctic Security and Governance, edited by Marc Jacobsen and Elana Wilson Rowe. Edward Elgar. www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/book/9781035318612/chapter11.xml.Open source In bibliography, and it has worked before: in 2019, evidence and talks brought the jamming down (Spansvoll 2023, 84)Course readingSpansvoll, Runar. 2023. “Studying Moscow’s Coercive Campaign Against Norway: The Bear Is Awake.” The RUSI Journal 168 (3): 74–85. doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2220756.Open DOI In bibliography. Therefore, the DGA should turn the pilot’s data into an evidence file stating where, when and how the jamming happened, and put it to use in three ways:

Conclusion: no more blind spots

In 1940, French and Norwegian troops won together at Narvik (Office of the Prime Minister of Norway 2026)Office of the Prime Minister of Norway. 2026. “The Prime Minister’s Statement at the Press Conference Following the Signing of the Mutual Defence Agreement Norway–France.” May 27. www.regjeringen.no/en/whats-new/the-prime-ministers-statement-at-the-press-conference-following-the-signing-of-the-mutual-defence-agreement-norway-france/id3163370/.Open source In bibliography. The arrangement named after that battle now faces a quieter battlefield, the electromagnetic spectrum, where no shot is fired and everything can be denied.

France has the satellites to end that denial. It should use them before the next aircraft to lose its signal in the High North is French.

References

48 works cited, including 4 course readings.

Chicago Manual of Style, 18th ed., author-date. Course readings are tagged Course reading. Links open the DOI or the online source.

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  6. DGA. 2024. “La DGA teste la résilience au brouillage, enjeu majeur pour les armées.” December 11. www.defense.gouv.fr/dga/actualites/dga-teste-resilience-au-brouillage-enjeu-majeur-armees.
  7. Euronews. 2022. “Russia Responsible for GPS Jamming in Europe, French Air Safety Official Claims.” April 1. www.euronews.com/next/2022/04/01/russia-responsible-for-gps-jamming-in-europe-french-air-safety-official-claims.
  8. European Space Agency. n.d. “Managing Signals at the Top of the World.” www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Preparing_for_the_Future/Space_for_Earth/Arctic/Managing_signals_at_the_top_of_the_world.
  9. Eye on the Arctic. 2025. “GPS Interference Forces Plane to Abort Landing in Arctic Norway.” Radio Canada International, September 18. www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2025/09/18/gps-interference-forces-plane-to-abort-landing-in-arctic-norway/.
  10. France et al. 2025. “Joint Statement Regarding Russian Satellite and RNSS Interferences.” ITU Council 2025, June. council.itu.int/2025/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2025/07/Statement_France-and-co-countries_260625-e.pdf.
  11. Gerrard, Nicolai, Tor Atle Solend, Anders Rødningsby, et al. 2026. “Jammertest: An Open GNSS Interference Test Arena to Accelerate the Development of Resilient GNSS Applications.” Engineering Proceedings 126 (1): 20. doi.org/10.3390/engproc2026126020.
  12. Hansen, Birgitte Annie, and Trine Jonassen. 2024. “Stops Registering GPS Disruptions in Finnmark, Northern Norway.” High North News, September 27. en.highnorthnews.com/politics/stops-registering-gps-disruptions-in-finnmark-northern-norway/212107.
  13. High North News. 2025. “No New Signs of GPS Interference in the Barents Sea.” August 27. en.highnorthnews.com/politics/no-new-signs-of-gps-interference-in-the-barents-sea/238521.
  14. High North News. 2026a. “Cold Response 2026: Over 30,000 from 14 Nations Exercise Defending the Northern Nordic Region.” March 10. en.highnorthnews.com/politics/cold-response-2026-over-30000-from-14-nations-exercise-defending-the-northern-nordic-region/1106150.
  15. High North News. 2026b. “Serious GPS Disruptions in East Finnmark: Russian Activity Creates Navigation Challenges.” April 28. en.highnorthnews.com/business/gps-disruptions-at-lower-altitudes-close-to-norways-border-to-russia/1110164.
  16. Hoogensen Gjørv, Gunhild. 2026. “Geopolitics and Hybrid Threats: The Reconfiguration of Arctic Exceptionalism?” Chap. 11 in A Research Agenda for Arctic Security and Governance, edited by Marc Jacobsen and Elana Wilson Rowe. Edward Elgar. www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/book/9781035318612/chapter11.xml.Course reading
  17. ICAO. 2025. “ICAO Assembly Condemns GNSS Radio Frequency Interference Originating from the DPRK and the Russian Federation.” October 3. www.icao.int/news/icao-assembly-condemns-gnss-radio-frequency-interference-originating-dprk-and-russian.
  18. Inside GNSS. 2025. “HawkEye 360 Launches Advanced GNSS Interference Detection Capabilities to Enhance Defense and Intelligence Operations.” July 29. insidegnss.com/hawkeye-360-launches-advanced-gnss-interference-detection-capabilities-to-enhance-defense-and-intelligence-operations/.
  19. Jammertest. 2026. “Jammertest 2026.” www.jammertest.no/jammertest-2026/.
  20. Knutsen, Bjørn Olav, and Elisabeth Pettersen. 2024. “War in Europe, but Still Low Tension in the High North? An Analysis of Norwegian Mitigation Strategies.” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 15: 25–46. doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v15.5065.Course reading
  21. Lagneau, Laurent. 2026a. “Guerre électronique : Thales et Eviden renforcent la résilience des systèmes de navigation de l’armée de Terre.” Zone Militaire (opex360.com), July 28. www.opex360.com/2026/07/28/guerre-electronique-thales-et-eviden-renforcent-la-resilience-des-systemes-de-navigation-de-larmee-de-terre/.
  22. Lagneau, Laurent. 2026b. “La DGA a relancé le projet de satellite de renseignement électromagnétique CELESTE.” Zone Militaire (opex360.com), March 1. www.opex360.com/2026/03/01/la-dga-a-relance-le-projet-de-satellite-de-renseignement-electromagnetique-celeste/.
  23. Lagneau, Laurent. 2026c. “La Norvège se rallie au concept de « dissuasion avancée » et signe un accord d’assistance mutuelle avec la France.” Zone Militaire (opex360.com), May 28. www.opex360.com/2026/05/28/la-norvege-se-rallie-au-concept-de-dissuasion-avancee-et-signe-un-accord-dassistance-mutuelle-avec-la-france/.
  24. Lemaire, Didier, and Thierry Tesson. 2026. Rapport d’information sur la guerre électronique. Rapport d’information 2507 (17e législature). Assemblée nationale, Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées. www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/17/rapports/cion_def/l17b2507_rapport-information.
  25. L’Essentiel de l’Éco. 2026. “Pourquoi l’armée française ne peut pas s’entraı̂ner à la guerre réelle.” March 11. lessentieldeleco.fr/6286-pourquoi-larmee-francaise-ne-peut-pas-sentrainer-a-la-guerre-reelle/.
  26. Luftfartstilsynet. 2026. “Norske flysikkerhetsresultater 2025.” www.luftfartstilsynet.no/aktorer/norske-flysikkerhetsresultater/norske-flysikkerhetsresultater-2025/.
  27. Marine nationale. 2026. “Norvège – Déploiement d’un avion de patrouille maritime Atlantique 2 (ATL2).” Ministère des Armées, January 22. www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/actualites/norvege-deploiement-dun-avion-patrouille-maritime-atlantique-2-atl2.
  28. Marine Stewardship Council. n.d. “Pêcherie de cabillaud et d’églefin d’Arctique Nord-Est.” www.msc.org/fr/nos-actions/notre-approche/les-pecheries-engagees/pecherie-cabillaud-eglefin.
  29. Ministère des Armées. 2025. Stratégie de défense pour l’Arctique. Strategy document. Ministère des Armées. www.defense.gouv.fr/dgris/enjeux-regionaux/poles/strategie-defense-larctique-fruk.
  30. Nilsen, Thomas. 2025. “Someone Is Messing with GPS Signals in Svalbard Airspace.” The Barents Observer, July 19. www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/someone-is-messing-with-gps-signals-in-svalbard-airspace/433658.
  31. Nilsen, Thomas. 2026. “Jamming Now Occurring at Lower Altitudes.” The Barents Observer, March 12. www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/jamming-now-occurring-at-lower-altitudes/446780.
  32. Nkom. 2024. “Betydelig økning i gps-jamming over Finnmark.” Press release, April 12. nkom.no/aktuelt/betydelig-okning-gps-jamming-finnmark.
  33. Nkom. 2025a. “Har avdekket alvorlige GPS-forstyrrelser i Øst-Finnmark.” Press release, January 17. nkom.no/aktuelt/har-avdekket-alvorlige-gps-forstyrrelser-i-ost-finnmark.
  34. Nkom. 2025b. “Har avdekket nye alvorlige GPS-forstyrrelser i Øst-Finnmark.” Press release, June 13. nkom.no/aktuelt/har-avdekket-nye-alvorlige-gps-forstyrrelser-i-ost-finnmark.
  35. Nkom. 2026. “Nkom styrker tilstedeværelsen i Finnmark for å overvåke GNSS-forstyrrelser.” Press release, May 21. nkom.no/aktuelt/nkom-styrker-tilstedevaerelsen-i-finnmark-for-a-overvake-gnss-forstyrrelser.
  36. Norwegian Ministry of Defence. 2026. “Norway and France Sign Mutual Defence Agreement.” May 27. www.regjeringen.no/en/whats-new/norway-and-france-sign-mutual-defence-agreement/id3161369/.
  37. Office of the Prime Minister of Norway. 2026. “The Prime Minister’s Statement at the Press Conference Following the Signing of the Mutual Defence Agreement Norway–France.” May 27. www.regjeringen.no/en/whats-new/the-prime-ministers-statement-at-the-press-conference-following-the-signing-of-the-mutual-defence-agreement-norway-france/id3163370/.
  38. Spansvoll, Runar. 2023. “Studying Moscow’s Coercive Campaign Against Norway: The Bear Is Awake.” The RUSI Journal 168 (3): 74–85. doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2220756.Course reading
  39. Spire Global. n.d. “Geolocating GNSS Jammers from LEO.” spire.com/blog/space-reconnaissance/geolocating-gnss-jammers-from-leo/.
  40. Stensrud, Cecilie Juul, and Andreas Østhagen. 2024. “Hybrid Warfare at Sea? Russia, Svalbard and the Arctic.” Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 7 (1): 111–30. doi.org/10.31374/sjms.233.Course reading
  41. The Barents Observer. 2024a. “Intensified GPS Jamming Is Side Effect of Russia’s Self-Protection of Kola Bases.” May 31. www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/intensified-gps-jamming-is-side-effect-of-russias-selfprotection-of-kola-bases/166119.
  42. The Barents Observer. 2024b. “Russian Jamming Is Now Messing Up GPS Signals for Norwegian Aviation Practically Every Day.” February 26. www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/russian-jamming-is-now-messing-up-gps-signals-for-norwegian-aviation-practically-every-day/163663.
  43. The Barents Observer. 2026a. “Norway Boosts GPS Jamming Detection amid Russian Escalation.” May 22. www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/norway-boosts-gps-jamming-detection-amid-russian-escalation/451004.
  44. The Barents Observer. 2026b. “Norway Softens Self-Imposed Restrictions on Allied Surveillance Aircraft Monitoring Russia’s Nuclear Fleet.” August 21. www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/norway-softens-selfimposed-restrictions-on-allied-surveillance-aircraft-monitoring-russias-nuclear-fleet/456117.
  45. The Record. 2024. “UN Urges Russia to `Immediately’ Cease Interference in European Satellites.” July 2. therecord.media/un-russia-satellite-interference-europe.
  46. Unseenlabs. 2026. “Gen 2: Space-Based RF for Multi-Domain Awareness.” unseenlabs.com/en/gen-2/.
  47. USNI News. 2026. “NATO Launches Arctic Sentry in High North in Response to Russian Activity.” February 16. news.usni.org/2026/02/16/nato-launches-arctic-sentry-in-high-north-in-response-to-russian-activity.
  48. UT Austin Radionavigation Laboratory. 2026. “Russian Satellites Caught Jamming GPS in Europe.” June. radionavlab.ae.utexas.edu/russian-satellites-caught-jamming-gps-across-europe/.